This is a monumentally ambitious book, tackling what is probably the biggest challenge for global leaders: how to move from the conflict of war to a secure peace.
The book’s joint authors have certainly put in the time and travel to research their subject, globetrotting to some of the most wretched, dangerous and depressing parts of our troubled planet.
“This volume is based on several decades of work in various conflict settings, including Iraq, Congo, Somalia, East Timor, Colombia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and, most recently, Ukraine and Israel,” David Kilcullen and Greg Mills note in The Art of War and Peace. Understanding our Choices in a World at War. If I were them, I would seek out a less sadistic travel agent.
The advantage of all this on-the-ground experience is that they can write with authority on several different instances of war and peace with shrewd insight and analysis. It is perhaps inevitable that it is easier to record what has been done badly, foolishly and greedily than to offer an easy solution to the formidable challenge of bringing warring factions to the peace table and then hammering out an enduring peace.
Mills has previously written scathingly, forcefully and convincingly on the panicked withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, but this remains an object lesson in how not to secure a noble peace, so it is sensible that it is returned to in The Art of War and Peace.
“The Afghan disaster was exacerbated by the complete absence of accountability: not a single elected leader, civilian official or military commander was asked to resign, or offered to do so. President Joe Biden went so far as to boast that the withdrawal was an extraordinary success, as if it were now a point of pride that nobody runs away better than the US and its allies?”
We are left with no doubt of the authors’ contempt for US leadership and strategy in so abruptly abandoning the people of Afghanistan to their fate. And Kilcullen and Mills are unflinching in pointing out the wider ripple effect of this loss of US credibility: “While some may question the direct link between the loss of US credibility in Kabul and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine six months later, what is less debatable is its impact on deterrence. Indeed, it takes wilful self-deception not to see the link between the collapse of the flagship 20-year Western effort in Afghanistan and the string of crises that followed in its wake — Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s missile launches over Taiwan, Hamas’ attack on Israel, the Gaza war that followed, the Ansarallah attacks on Red Sea commercial shipping, Venezuela’s invasion threat against Guyana, and deadly attacks on US personnel across the Middle East.”
The authors are also critical of the US leader over his initial hesitancy in supporting Ukraine.
“On the threshold of Russian invasion, any deterrence offered by Ukraine’s international supporters was undermined by President Biden’s statement that putting US troops in Ukraine was ‘not on the table’.
“By removing this option from consideration, and not saying clearly that the US would supply Ukraine with funding and modern equipment as it has since done, Biden massively undermined the deterrent effect that he was (in theory, at least) seeking to achieve.”
They warn that if Ukraine loses the war, the long-term, strategic implications for the democratic world “would be both profound and negative”.
“There is a real chance of some or all of the following: damage to Western credibility, an impact on Nato, the cementing of an emerging coalition of authoritarian states, the diversion of spending from productive enterprise to defence, the tilting of the world’s economic and political centre of gravity towards China, damage to the US dollar’s standing as a reserve currency, and increased likelihood of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.”
While it is difficult to envisage a peaceful end to the Ukraine conflict, what of the complexities of the Israel-Hamas situation?
Kilcullen and Mills warn of a fundamental problem that there is no vision of an “advantageous peace, which could shape the pursuit of military goals”.
“Without such an object beyond war, battlefield success, even if it is achievable, can never lead to a successful war termination since there is no post-conflict objective to pursue.”
They argue that if there is to be any resolution to the Gaza conflict Israel will need to empower the Palestinian Authority to advance the cause of peace, to build the trust to produce that outcome, and to align the region as guarantors for any ceasefire and subsequent agreement.
If Kilcullen and Mills have little time for Biden, they are not pinning much hope on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu either.
One strength of this book is that it does not confine itself to headline conflicts but delves into parts of the globe where there is less media attention.
“While the world has been focused on Ukraine and the Middle East, state-led violence continues elsewhere. In the Horn of Africa alone, the cost in human lives from conflict has topped at least 1-million since 2020. At least 150,000 troops were killed in the two-year war in Tigray starting in 2020, along with perhaps as many as 600,000 civilians,” they note.
There is extensive coverage of the Tigray peace settlement, and also a useful discussion of the Angolan civil war and of the failings of Zimbabwe since its independence. There is coverage of Columbia, too.
While there may be a valid semantic discussion of the degree to which the transition to democracy in SA represented the end of an actual war, this peace is also explored, with few plaudits for the ANC for presiding over such widespread corruption.
“The signs had been there earlier on that the ANC would engage in corrupt practices aimed at the self-enrichment of its leaders … such a redistributive process was legalised (and, indeed, legislated) through BEE, which was ostensibly aimed at improving the lot of the impoverished but, in fact, gave politically connected individuals stakes in large corporations based on government stipulations,” we read.
“But there were those in the ANC for whom this was never going to be enough. The 1999 arms deal provided further opportunities for illicit commissions, a deal that increased from R30bn to an estimated R142bn by the time it was finally paid off in 2020. Such commissions became common practice and were amplified during the Zuma era through so-called tenderpreneurship and other schemes that cut in middlemen (and middle-women) to government contracts.
“The Zondo public commission of inquiry into state capture estimated that one-third of SA’s R5-trillion GDP was squandered during this time.
“Unlike in India, say, where there is corruption but a thriving economy, peace in SA has been lost in the overwhelming urge to redistribute without controls and absent the underpinnings of governance necessary for sustained growth.”
This timely, agonisingly relevant and morbidly fascinating book proves convincingly that the art of peace is complex and challenging.
“A military solution is not enough. Above all, a political strategy is necessary to win any war, along with an operational-level plan to translate battlefield success into political outcomes. What is required for such a strategy is clear sight of an endgame, and of a final and sustainable peaceful end-state.”
Leadership is a necessary and vital ingredient in any peace process, which helps to explain the authors’ harsh criticism of the US.
“Across multiple examples, one constant is the need for thoughtful, firm, prescient leaders willing to lead by example.
“A clearly defined political aim and a unified system of command are also imperative for effective war termination, without which any combatant side risks overstretch, confusion and failure.
“Overall, to improve the chances for peace, states must put peace above their national interests, and leaders must put national above personal interests.”
Which, as this invaluable book demonstrates, is easier said than done.
Published in Business Day
ZA Confidential 