SA may need crisis plan if there is a hard Brexit

teresa-may

Embattled Theresa May

By Raymond Parsons

The latest U.K. political developments regarding Brexit now need to be closely monitored by SA to protect its economic interests in the event of a hard Brexit on 29 March 2019.

There remains a great deal at stake for SA in the eventual outcome of Brexit, as the EU and the U.K. are SA’s largest trading partners. The decision by the U.K. Government to delay the Parliamentary vote on the Brexit deal has now pushed the process back into uncharted waters.

The real danger now exists that the U.K. may well crash out of the EU without a withdrawal agreement and, if that occurs, it would have serious ripple effects through key parts of the international trading system and supply chains, including SA.

If a worse-case no deal scenario happens, Britain would immediately change from the trade rules of the EU to those of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Its economy would then also become subject to the EU’s common external tariff and customs requirements.

Changing to WTO rules is however more than about tariffs, and involves other legal and economic changes which would seriously affect many sectors of the U.K. economy with whom other countries do business.

Trade beyond the EU, such as with SA, might also be involved, as many trade deals Britain benefits from were negotiated through the EU, and would lapse with a no-deal Brexit. It would also require the imposition of a hard border between the Republic of Ireland and the six U.K. counties of Northern Ireland.

Various institutions, including the UK Treasury and the Bank of England, have emphasised the heavy economic cost of a potential Brexit no-deal for the U.K.

The International Monetary Fund estimates that, in the event of a no-deal, the U.K. would lose about 5% of its GDP within a few years – the Dutch, Danes and Belgians would lose 1% or more as well.

The Irish would probably lose about 5% of their GDP. And although the expected fall in the pound would be helpful to exporters, the resultant inflation and potentially higher interest rates are seen by some analysts as presaging a shrinking U.K. economy with much less market potential in future.

For SA, there will eventually be both risks and opportunities in the event of a hard Brexit in March 2019. A fresh audit of the latest EU-U.K. economic developments therefore needs to be made.

It is important now that both government and the business sectors in SA most affected by Brexit remain alert to the possibility of a no-deal Brexit as one possible outcome and how it might affect key EU-UK-SA economic relations.

It may be necessary to evolve contingency plans to ensure that SA’s economic interests in the U.K. and the EU are adequately protected and any likely disruption to trade be kept to the minimum.’.

Professor Raymond Parsons is at NWU

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Ramaphosa is missing an economic policy. What needs to be in it.

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South Africa needs a new economic policy that envisages an overhaul of the power utility Eskom, which can’t keep the lights on.
EPA/Nic Bothma

Mark Swilling, Stellenbosch University

As the entrails of the era under South Africa’s former president Jacob Zuma continue to be exposed each day before a commission set up to investigate corruption, so the country witnesses the consolidation of the political project spearheaded by the new head of state Cyril Ramaphosa.

But a key piece of the puzzle is missing: Ramaphosa’s government doesn’t have an economic policy. All that’s been forthcoming is a stimulus package, plus two summits – one on jobs, the other on investment. Do these add up to an economic policy?

The answer is no. Here’s why.

I agree with South African economist Duma Gqubule that the stimulus package is a mix of short-term stimulus measures and longer-term structural transformation measures, without doing justice to either. The short-term measures don’t include the usual elements of a stimulus package such as lower interest rates and increased spending. And the longer-term structural transformation measures, such as the infrastructure investment programme, is nothing new.

More importantly, the longer-term vision ignores the changing nature of the global economy. This is being transformed by three factors: new information and communication technologies, the renewable energy revolution and the recomposition of work, as old jobs fall away and new ones created.

South Africa urgently needs a coherent economic policy that takes account of these realities. This can’t be driven by an industrialisation strategy that relies on 20th Century capital intensive sectors like mining, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and the military. Many are in decline. Take coal mining: mines are being closed as countries switch to renewable energy, which is now cheaper than fossil fuels in nearly 100 countries, including in South Africa. Investment in renewables in 2017 was R280 billion, twice what was invested in fossil fuels and nuclear combined in that year.

And the new policy mustn’t be written only by economists, as in the past. Economists need to work with South Africa’s scientists.

South Africa has dug itself into a deep hole. Ramaphosa’s efforts to root out corruption are a good – but not sufficient – first step to getting the economy onto a sound footing.

The history

The recent resignation of Home Affairs Minister Malusi Gigaba from government should not be underestimated. It was on his watch, as head of several ministries, that the influential Gupta family, which sits at the centre of the country’s web of corruption, secured a free hand to “capture” key state owned enterprises. He, together with other ministers, agreed to participate in a political project that resulted in a silent coup that effectively marginalised and hollowed out the African National Congress (ANC). The goal was to capture and repurpose state institutions.

Gigaba represents a generation that has done okay under the ANC since 1994, but want to do a whole lot better by grabbing their share of key sectors. They gambled on the alliance with the Zuma-Gupta network. And burnt their fingers.

Zuma was elected president of the ANC at its Polokwane conference in 2007 on the back of a wave of discontent. Black business was no longer willing to hang onto the coattails of white business; trade unions were fed up with limited state intervention; the ANC was unhappy with the centralisation of power in the presidency; and provincial leaders felt snubbed.

After some years of dithering, what became known from 2014 onwards as “radical economic transformation” was in fact a strategy to build a black industrial class by using the procurement spend of around R200 billion by the country’s state owned enterprises.

In theory, not a bad strategy. After all, this is a way of using state resources to build real assets owned by black people. As recent research showed, 90% of all assets are owned by 10% of the population, most of whom are white.

To operationalise the strategy speedily it was necessary to circumvent the legal framework. For that, brokers who were prepared to take the risks were needed. And so, enter the Guptas. A host of politicians were drawn into the web as well as South African and global businesses, including KPMG, McKinsey, SAP, T-Systems and Bain.

Chicken and egg: investment and growth

During the recent investment summit Ramaphosa grandly announced that the “investment strike” was over.

But many economists, such as Professor Adrian Saville, argue that investment never drives growth. Instead, investment follows growth.

In theory, heavy state investment in infrastructure (as promised in the stimulus package) is a good thing. But what matters is the type of infrastructure and how private investment is crowded in, without flipping into privatisation (which has its own set of challenges). For example, the massive investment in renewable energy (over R200 billion) since 2011 would not have happened if the state did not reduce risk by providing guarantees for the loans.

Given South Africa’s vast array of state owned enterprises, which includes the power utility Eskom as well as the national airline SAA, it’s obvious the country needs an economic policy that prioritises their investments. Yes, most need to be cleaned up and refinanced. But that is not enough. Radical thinking needs to be applied to entities such as Eskom, which has requested a R100 billion bailout.

Its role could be redesigned entirely. But a plan for a complete overhaul would be best served by merging the country’s best economic and scientific thinking. Together, they could generate an economic policy that puts energy at the centre. In line with global trends, this would need to be renewable energy, because it creates more jobs, is distributed across small towns rather than concentrated in a few industrial nodes, and can drive a new job-creating industrialisation strategy.

In short, South Africa needs a policy that drives growth and positions South Africa for the 21st Century. For such a policy to work, the country will need an effective and capable state. And the great divide between science and economics must be bridged.The Conversation

Mark Swilling, Distinguished Professor of Sustainable Development, Stellenbosch University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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What is Eskom trying to hide?

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By Chris Gilmour

Once again, power utility Eskom has come to spoil the festive spirit for everyone with its rotational power cuts (referred to in Eskom-speak as load-shedding). This hasn’t been a feature, thankfully, for quite some time now and most of us would be forgiven for thinking that the appointment of a new board at the beginning of this year should have put an end to power cuts.

But no – as we are in the dark literally regarding the physical lack of power, we are also in the dark figuratively about what has caused this dire situation. If this carries on much longer, not only will many peoples’ festive seasons be ruined, but economic growth will undoubtedly begin to suffer as well.

But this time around there is a different feel to that during previous rotational power cuts. It’s as if this shouldn’t really be happening – and yet a cadre of individuals at the top of Eskom and within the ANC government appear to know precisely what is going on, but are not giving us the full story.

Eskom is in deep trouble, not just at an operational level but also regarding its financials. Not only can it no longer provide a reliable source of energy; it is extremely doubtful whether it remains a going concern. With R419 billion of debt, there is no way that it can trade its way out of the mess in which it finds itself, an observation endorsed by chairman Jabu Mabuza’s remarks at the recent results presentation in which he said the current situation was “not sustainable”.

Adding spice to the story is a report from the Mpumalanga Chamber of Commerce that states unequivocally that substantial coal stocks are piling up in that province, with Eskom showing no evidence of urgency in procuring this coal.

According to Eskom, the current situation is as a direct result of a lack of maintenance of its power plants, especially in the past couple of years, with ancillary factors being a loss of power from Cahora Bassa in Mozambique due to power lines being down, a shortage of diesel to operate the two open-cycle gas turbine (OCGT) plants in the western Cape and a lack of head of water to properly operate pumped storage systems properly.

The poor maintenance has resulted in a number of plant breakdowns (unplanned maintenance in Eskom-speak). To try to get a handle on just how bad this situation is, it is necessary to take a long, hard, look at Eskom’s total electrical generating capacity.

Currently the utility operates a fleet of 13 coal powered stations whose commissioning dates range from 1966 (Komati power station) to 1996 (Majuba power station). There are two other coal-fired stations being built, Medupi and Kusile, but both are years behind schedule and only a few units from each are currently supplying power to the national grid. Once Medupi and Kusile are both fully commissioned around 2022, the gap between new builds will have been 22 years.

There is a solitary nuclear plant at Koeberg in the western Cape, which produces approximately 1 800 Megawatts (Mw) of power. The thirteen coal-fired plants have a combined nameplate output of 37 530Mw. Thus, coal and nuclear combined can produce 39 330Mw of power. These stations produce what is referred to in the industry as “base-load” power. In other words, this is the basic power that is produced on a continuous basis, day and night, except when stations are switched off for essential maintenance.

In addition to these base-load stations, Eskom also derives power from a variety of other sources, including Open-Cycle Gas Turbines (OCGTs), hydro power, a variant of hydro power called pumped storage power, as well as buying power from the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme in Mozambique. OCGTs, as the name suggests, were originally intended to run on natural gas, but have been modified to run on significantly more expensive diesel.

Eskom’s two OCGTs produce approximately 2 000Mw combined, while its four small hydroelectric plants – Palmiet, Gariep, Vanderkloof and Port Rex – have a combined capacity of approximately 1 000Mw. The two large pumped storage systems – Drakensberg and Ingula – do not produce additional electricity in their own right but are able to produce power at peak times

Eskom also has a power purchase agreement with an independent OCGT operator called Avon, which operates two diesel-powered plants called Avon and Dedisa – that collectively produce 1 000Mw of power when required.

And then there is renewable energy, comprising a number of solar and wind farms dotted around the country. These are mainly owned by the private sector and have been steadily producing power, in terms of the Renewable Energy Independent Power Procurement Programme (REIPP), for a number of years.

Opinions vary as to how much capacity is available from this source, but a figure of around 6 000Mw seems to be the consensus view. However, due to the intermittent nature of wind and solar power, only a percentage of this capacity can be relied upon at any given time. Industry experts usually agree on 25%, and thus the total available from renewables is probably no more than 1 500Mw.

To dimension just how bad the situation is, consider this: Eskom is able to produce around 45 000MW of electricity, if all plants are working at nameplate capacity and there are no breakdowns, planned or otherwise. It also has access to at least another 4 000MW in the form of electricity from Cahora Bassa and the combined output from independent suppliers, either in the form of renewable or non-renewable energy.

That is a total of around 49 000MW. In the first week of December, demand was running at around 29 000MW and from the 10th of December to the end of December, it is unlikely to exceed 25 000MW. Is it conceivable, therefore, that Eskom has outages totalling 24 000MW on any given day?

If so, the utility is plumbing new and uncharted depths in its breakdown patterns. And if that is indeed correct, it is exceptionally worrying and highlights the extent of Eskom’s operational problems.

Eskom hosted a media conference at its Megawatt Park HQ last week and Minster of State-Owned Enterprises Pravin Gordhan was in attendance. It appeared to be a full and frank discussion, and questions appeared not to be deflected to any great extent. Gordhan pointed out that the new build programme was disappointing – not only in terms of the time and cost over-runs, but also in terms of the generators at Medupi not meeting nameplate output.

We can draw some solace from the weekly status reports that Eskom supplies on its website. This shows that demand is forecast to plummet from the week beginning Monday 10 December, as industries wind down for the holiday period and families go on vacation. And yet, as this column is being written (Sunday 9 December) we have been subject to another Saturday of rotational power cuts. Something is seriously amiss.

There are those of a conspiratorial turn of mind who have suggested that Eskom is engineering this crisis with a view to turning public and government opinion in the direction of looking seriously at some type of privatisation.

It is rumoured that Eskom has already presented a turnaround plan to government that envisaged some sort of private sector involvement, splitting the utility up into its component parts of generation, transmission and distribution and widespread retrenchments. Understandably, government is believed to have been spooked by such a suggestion, just months away from a general election in May 2019.

It is not clear how Eskom can extricate itself from the mess in which it finds itself. The utility was hollowed out during the Zuma years, undoubtedly, but had been limping along long before that. When the utility was established in the early 1920s, its main aim was to provide cheap, reliable energy to the mines and industry.

Residential supply came much later and gradually replaced the host of municipal power stations that had been built up until the 1950s. To be sure, Eskom only catered for the white population from inception until the late 1980s/early 1990s. But with the dawn of democracy, it really came to the party in terms of electrifying the townships. Properly managed, Eskom could have been a genuine force for good in South Africa – but instead, it was hijacked for political purposes and has been badly mismanaged for over 20 years. There is now more than a 20-year gap in supply, due to Eskom prevaricating over its new build programme. The utility went from a huge over-supply situation to being in deficit in a remarkably short space of time and it has never really managed to catch up.

Thanks to successive substantial price increases over many years, Eskom’s global price-competitiveness has now totally evaporated. It has gone from being one of the cheapest global suppliers of electricity to being in the mid to upper band. And that situation will only get worse if the electricity regulator, NERSA, grants Eskom it 15% increases over the next three years.

Electricity demand has been falling in South Africa for a number of years now, due to a variety of reasons but predominantly because consumers are unable or unwilling to pay the expensive tariffs now demanded by Eskom.

There is a solution to Eskom’s situation, but it is one that is politically unpalatable. It is not too far removed form the plan that is rumoured to have been presented to government recently. First, Eskom must be split into its three component parts of generation, transmission and distribution.

Then the private sector must be invited to participate either in part or in whole. The private sector would leap at the chance of participating in distribution and transmission but there is unlikely to be an appetite for Eskom’s old and broken power plants. The various businesses will require to be streamlined with the attendant job cuts.

The consequences of maintaining the status quo are horrific. Eskom needs large chunks of institutional money, and fast. But with a rating deep in junk territory, it cannot in all conscience even consider taking on more debt. It has asked government for a R100m bailout, but unless extremely tight conditions are imposed, it will be yet another example of throwing good money after bad in another failed state-owned enterprise.

If it doesn’t get a bailout, it will limp along, attempting to patch up its creaking infrastructure and hoping that the highly-trained individuals at its operations nerve-centre at Simmerpan in Ekurhuleni continue to manage supply and demand.

If they don’t manage this delicate demand and supply balance, Eskom’s worst nightmare could result-a total breakdown of the entire system.

That would plunge the country into a situation from which it would be difficult and time-consuming to recover. Provided there is water in the two reservoirs at the Drakensberg and Ingula pumped storage systems, Eskom could use these two stations to attempt what is known in the industry as a “black start”. A black start is the equivalent of applying a defibrillator to the system, hoping that the grid can be gradually brought back up into service. Opinions vary as to how long the situation would persist, but most experts agree that it would take at least two weeks to get the power stations up and running again and synchronised to the grid.

This is a worst-case scenario and the odds of it occurring are extremely low. But in a dysfunctional utility like Eskom, with a continuing loss of institutional memory and operational ability, it remains a possibility.

Let’s just cross our fingers (or in South African parlance hold thumbs) that this cataclysmic situation never materialises.

Chris Gilmour is an Investment Analyst|Commentator|Writer

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Auto makers win a major battle against BEE

Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies

If you ever wondered about the immense power of the auto industry lobby, you need only look at the automotive masterplan, which was unveiled on Friday by Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies.

This charts a path to 2035, and gives an assurance that the big auto companies will continue to be the most pampered of international investors in SA, with a range of incentives and sweeteners.

One improvement on the existing support programme is that they must use more local content, rising to a 60% share in 2035 from just under 40% at present.

This is important not just in trade terms, but because the robot-infested assembly plants have a far lower employment profile than the more labour-intensive component companies.

One in the bag for Rob Davies.

On the other hand, the auto giants have been able to bully their way out of a major BEE requirement which applies to almost every other investor in SA (Caterpillar also managed to crawl out of it).

This is a requirement to hand over a certain minimum stake in your business to BEE partners.

Instead, there will be ‘equity equivalence’, as they put it. The auto makers will do other stuff to uplift black South Africans, and they have already announced a R3.5bn fund for this very purpose.

Davies was anxious to point out the importance of his incentive regime to support the auto industry.

He gave the example of Australia, which phased out its own auto incentives, and where the last car plant has closed. Damm.

However, this begs a multi-billion rand question…..

Has the collapse of auto assembly crippled the Australian economy? I don’t think so. And presumably neither do they, or the state support would still be in place.

Is it wise for our government to put the largest chunk of its (shrinking) investment incentive support armoury into the very labour-unintensive auto sector?

The counter-argument is that by having a world-class auto industry, SA can attract other investment, can help arrest the decline in manufacturing, can build and preserve skills.

It’s a tough one.

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Big business must be wary of being perceived as big shits

Big business needs to be so aware of reputational risk. As we have seen with Momentum and Discovery. You can follow the letter of the law, but can still be judged a bunch of shits. I am a client of both these companies, but have been disturbed by the lack of judgement shown them both.

Momentum

This insurer had every right to refuse to pay out to the widow of someone who was shot. Wait for it…..refusing payment because he had high blood sugar levels, and had not informed Momentum of this.

But what is legal is not always morally right. And by initially refusing to pay out, waiting for their u-turn until being shamed into doing one, the company has caused major reputational harm to itself. Its complacent bosses, living in their smug corporate bubble, did nothing wrong, legally. But, oh boy, when it comes to their image and reputation, they screwed-up big-time.

Discovery

The Discovery issue is more nuanced, and the wrongs or rights of its actions very much depend on where you sit in this racially-troubled county of ours.

I have no first-hand grasp on the announcement regarding the launch of their new bank, as I was not invited, and received no info. Possibly because my former employer has cut off access to my previous corporate e-mail address. So maybe the invitation is there, out of my reach. Let us give Discovery the benefit of the doubt.

However, looking at social media, they have been strongly attacked by some for one element of their announcement – a decision to offer shares in the new bank to their customers. If they are black.

It is both legal and desirable to extend the economic benefits of our rainbow nation to those racial groups which were victimised by apartheid.

Nothing wrong with ensuring a solid black ownership in the bank to black people. Indeed, I understand that the law requires this.

But what a clumsy way to do it. Good news for the black customers. A big incentive to bank with Discovery.

However…looked at from the perspective of any white people who may wish to bank with Discovery, it is not the same story. They may feel they are the victims of discrimination. Because of the colour of their skin. Remind you of anything, does it?

Could Discovery not have been more sensitive over this issue? Could it not have ensured a large black shareholding in the new bank by some other, non-discriminatory, mechanism? Were they not aware of the perceptions which would arise?

Conclusion

Neither Discovery nor Momentum wished to act illegally. Both were completely entitled to act as they did, and acted within the law.

But the law is just one factor in all this.

Large corporates need to be sensitive to a larger picture, to the race issues and crime which still pollute our country.

Listen to your lawyers. But listen to your hearts as well. Or your customers may tend to suspect you have no heart, nor much judgement either.

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Cyril’s European travels began too late

President Macron of France marks Armistice Day

John Fraser

I see President Cyril Ramaphosa has arrived at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, a venue where I spent many good times and bad.

Coming from SA, he may well feel at home surrounded by politicians and bureaucrats who enjoy the good life, and are adept at expense fiddling.

But I would argue that his arrival in France has come just a few days too late.

Of course it is vital to keep a close dialogue with the EU, which is our largest trading partner. Particularly as it is plunging into the uncertainty of Brexit.

But could he not have arrived at the weekend, and joined those other world leaders, and the buffoon Trump, in paying Remembrance Day tribute to the fallen heroes?

Few of us today can imagine the squalor, the misery, the terror, of trench warfare. It sounds like ancient history to many, but very many of us have had parents and grandparents who served in world wars. Many of whom did not return home.

Of course, there were complexities and divided loyalties in South Africa when the great powers of Europe decided to engage in such ferocious mutual slaughter.

This, however, takes nothing away from the courage of so many millions who were sent to die.

The two world wars saw South Africans of every race and colour being sent to distant battlefields. As did fallen heroes who had come from many other countries. The last century was a warlike one, acted out in so many places

As we saw Macron, Merkel, Putin and – yes, even Trump – show that the bravery and sacrifice of so many is still remembered and honoured, could our own State President not have also been present in Paris at the weekend?

He could easily have got there somehow, despite the implosion of SAA, and could then have gone on to his other engagements.

I know he works horribly hard, appears to be several times more active and effective than his ghastly predecessor, whose priorities may have been a little different to Cyril’s statesmanship.

But as a South African with ancestors who did serve in the wars, I would have liked to have seen Ramaphosa on Sunday flying the SA flag in Paris.

There is no doubt, after all, that he would have done a better job than Trump.

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Explained: lessons from the collapse of a small South African bank

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Jannie Rossouw, University of the Witwatersrand

The South African Reserve Bank placed VBS, a small mutual bank, under curatorship in March this year against a backdrop of a serious liquidity crisis. The initial findings of the curator revealed significant financial losses, which prompted a decision to institute a forensic investigation. This was completed by early October and handed over to the banking regulator, the Prudential Authority. The report revealed widespread looting and subsequent cover-ups. The report was handed over to the country’s law enforcement authorities for further investigation and possible prosecutions. In the words of Advocate Terry Motau who headed up the investigation:

I have, for the past five months, investigated the sorry affairs of the VBS Mutual Bank. My report will reveal that the perpetrators of the heist at VBS made away with almost R2 billion.

Last week the banking regulator asked a South African court to terminate the curatorship and for permission to wind up the affairs of the bank. The regulator argued that liquidation was necessary because VBS was hopelessly insolvent after being subject to massive fraud. This meant that there was no prospect of saving the bank. The South African Reserve Bank responded to questions on the issue from Jannie Rossouw, who is Head of School of Economic & Business Sciences, at the University of the Witwatersrand.


What drove the regulator’s decisions?

In the first instance the decision to place the bank under curatorship was taken because the bank regulator realised that swift action was needed given the liquidity crisis that had come to light. This was necessary both to protect depositors as well as to make sure that no further damage could be done to the bank. The welfare of the depositors and the speed of execution was important.

The decision to go to court and ask for VBS to be liquidated six months later followed evidence that came to light as a result of the forensic investigation. The report showed that the bank had been subject to massive fraud. It was incumbent on the regulator to take action in the light of this evidence. As argued in the application, the regulator believes that the damage done to the bank is irreparable. And that it can’t be saved.

Why the decision to go from curatorship to liquidation?

When a bank is put under curatorship, the curatorship provides tools and instruments to manage the bank’s liquidity and its operations to save the bank, to put it back on a sound footing and to protect depositor funds. The idea is that the bank can be nursed back to health.

So the aim of curatorship is ultimately to turn the bank around. An example of this being executed successfully in South Africa was African Bank which was put under curatorship. It continues to operate today.

But the law states that when the registrar of banks is of the view that the bank is insolvent, they are legally obliged to go to court to apply for liquidation. This does not mean that the bank cannot be saved. But it does mean that the registrar is of the view – based on all the available evidence – that the bank is insolvent and probably can’t be saved. That is, that the probability of the bank being saved is limited.

The decision to apply for liquidation was made on the basis that the Prudential Authority believes the final winding-up of VBS is in the best interests of all parties. It paves the way for two things to happen. Firstly, it will allow a liquidator to use the insolvency law and the Companies Act to effect recoveries – in other words to protect people who had deposited money with the bank. And, secondly, it will mean that the recommendations of the investigator into the affairs of VBS can be followed.

What does liquidation actually mean? What happens now?

Liquidation provides for the winding down of a bank under the terms set out in the Companies Act. The bank will still be managed to maximise depositor value, to collect on loans and to recover as much money as possible. It does, however, reduce the discretion on the creditor hierarchy. In other words a curator has more discretion about who gets paid out what amount. Under liquidation, that discretion is removed.

Nevertheless, the National Treasury has issued a guarantee that will ensure that 97% of retail depositors will be covered. That guarantee will remain should the court agree to the bank’s liquidation.

What are the key lessons learnt from VBS?

There are a number.

The first is that audit reports need to be treated with a degree of circumspection. In some cases they will require independent verification.

Another lesson is that the bank regulator needs stronger tools to force a bank to convert from a mutual bank licence to a full bank licence when they get to the point of being too big to fall under the mutual bank regulations.

Mutual Banks are very different to commercial banks. The three main differences are that they tend to be smaller, that some types of deposits in mutual banks qualify as an ownership stake in the mutual bank and lastly that they’re not regulated to the same standard as commercial banks. Because they don’t carry as many risks, the regulatory framework governing them is substantially lighter.

But the events of VBS have shown that supervising small banks requires more resources. This is true even though the failure of a smaller bank won’t necessarily lead to systemic risk – it won’t pose a threat to the entire banking and financial services sector. But the risks still need to be managed better.The Conversation

Jannie Rossouw, Head of School of Economic & Business Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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Did South Africa’s investment summit mark a game-changing moment?

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South African president Cyril Ramaphosa addresses a recent investment summit.
Flickr.com/GovernmentZA

Alan Hirsch, University of Cape Town

To some observers, South Africa’s recent investment summit led by the president Cyril Ramaphosa, seemed like much ado about nothing. Several of the projects announced had been incorporated into companies’ plans for some time. And, combined with the fact that the summit had a showbiz style about it, it’s tempting to see the event as little more than smoke and mirrors.

But the summit could be more than the sum of its parts. It could be an important step forward to reviving economic growth in South Africa.

One notable outcome was that, in one crucial respect, Ramaphosa nailed his colours firmly to the mast. After the confused and confusing sophistry of the era under Jacob Zuma’s presidency, Ramaphosa committed his government to a market economy, where obstacles to private investment would be removed, where possible.

This moment is reminiscent of 1980 in India. That year, Indira Gandhi committed the Indian Congress Party to business-friendly policies. Reforms were slow, picking up a little under Rajiv Gandhi a few years later. And the major structural economic reforms only took place in 1991 under India’s new Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao and the new Finance Minister Manmohan Singh.

Yet, India’s growth spurt clearly began after Indira Gandhi’s signalling and Rajiv’s initial tinkering. It didn’t wait for Rao and Singh’s dramatic reforms a decade later.

This is consistent with contemporary analysis of economic growth. Recent thinking by renowned Harvard-based economist Ricardo Hausmann and colleagues suggests that what stimulates significant growth acceleration is often not major structural changes – it can be significant incremental shifts.

The economists found that major structural reforms seldom preceded significant growth accelerations. As his colleague Dani Rodrik put it recently:

in economies that suffer from multiple distortions, small changes can make big differences.

The small change made in India was a clear shift by the dominant political party towards business-friendly policies.

Could the same be true for South Africa? Has South Africa reached it’s own Indira Gandhi moment?

Signals at the summit

Amid a great deal of fanfare, an audience of 1300 business and government leaders, and one of the globe’s most successful entrepreneurs Chinese internet commerce magnate Jack Ma, Ramaphosa announced R209 billion worth of investment at the summit.

It was important for the president to meet expectations by announcing concrete outcomes. But what was possibly more important was that he used the opportunity to send out a number of signals.

To please his own constituencies in the African National Congress (ANC) and the unions, he referred to the end of the “investment strike”; some critics of business had said they were holding back their investments as a deliberate policy.

More significantly, most of his messaging was aimed at reassuring the business community. He talked about how their investments and property were safe and how their factories were protected from expropriation by an independent judiciary and the rule of law.

Land reform would continue, he said. But it would be “fair and equitable”. Transformation would continue:

while providing certainty to those who own land, those who need land, and to those who are considering investing in the economy.

Perhaps the most telling signal was the apparently off-the-cuff remark he made dismissing the concept of “white monopoly capital”. At the dinner which followed the conference he said:

We have become accustomed to … treating our entrepreneurs and business-people (badly) and called them all sorts of names. We’ve treated them like enemies and… (called them) white monopoly capital – that must end today.

The term “white monopoly capital” is an accurate approximation of the distribution of economic power under apartheid, and much of the imbalance in economic power remains. In the Zuma era, the term was popularised by the now defunct public relations firm Bell Pottinger under contract to the Gupta family and was used by some as a cover for looting government and its agencies.

Ramaphosa, who became a successful capitalist after he left Parliament in the mid-1990s, has now signalled that he wants to build trust between government and white owned businesses. This won’t be easy. There are still elements in the ANC that reject capitalism while others want to continue using the term “white monopoly capitalism” as a battering ram.

Credibility gap

South Africa’s disadvantage is that the country’s credibility has been damaged. After 15 years of transparent social democratic policies – from 1994 to 2009 – the country lurched into confusion under Zuma’s presidency. The ANC government became opaque, volatile and unpredictable.

The consequence was a loss of credibility in the Zuma era. Ramaphosa’s biggest challenge therefore is to recover credibility.

Ramaphosa and his advisors will be asking what can we do to rebuild credibility fast?

The answer seems simple: those involved in state capture must go, looters must be punished, and constructive policies must be carefully prepared and implemented with authority and urgency. These include fixing the state owned enterprises as Finance Minister Tito Mboweni repeatedly pointed out in his recent budget speech , better regulation for the network industries (energy, telecommunications, water) and sorting out public transport systems. In addition, honest leaders need to be appointed to the criminal justice institutions.

These all have been promised since Ramaphosa’s first State of the Nation Address in February.

The trickier, and implicit question that investment decision-makers will be asking is, is Ramaphosa’s sway over government as strong as that of Indira Gandhi’s in India in 1980? Or is the president yet to demonstrate complete control over the ANC?

The answer, unfortunately, is probably that an election has to be reasonably convincingly won before he can win the credibility he so badly needs.The Conversation

Alan Hirsch, Professor and Director of The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Time for the Cyril shuffle

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Show us your shuffle, Cyril

By John Fraser

Our hardworking and hard-walking President is now in Germany, and I do hope they give him a few hours off for some much-deserved beer and sausages.

The Investment Conference on Friday gave him a platform to sell SA, and he did so very commendably.

However, sitting in a breakaway session of the conference, it was noteworthy to see two of our most reviled ministers on the platform. Both are believed to have been active state capturers, yet both we were referred to by the MC as “honourable”. Pass the sick bag, Mabel.

There has been much talk of the need for a Cabinet reshuffle, which will hopefully reduce the number of ministries, and send some of our more crooked politicians scuttling under the nearest rock.

One suggestion is that we get rid of the deputy ministers. How about we keep all those deputies who we can readily name? That should clear the decks quite comprehensively.

If ministries do get the chop, my prime candidates would be anything in the Presidency, apart from Cyril himself, the feeble Small Business bunch, and the Communications portfolio, mainly so we can see the back of the current incumbent.

Getting rid of the Deputy President position would also be a useful way of removing another member of the awful old guard.

Will it happen? The President holds a precarious position in the ANC, where the corrupt forces of evil still hold a lot of power. So maybe he will have to hold on to some of the shits, as he did when first he named his current Cabinet.

But whether or not it will happen, it damn well should.

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ANC will go to the polls with only one major asset: its president Ramaphosa

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South African President Cyril Ramaphosa is now more popular than his governing party, the ANC.
EFE-EPA/Stringer

Roger Southall, University of the Witwatersrand

It is common cause that the performance of South Africa’s government, led by the African National Congress (ANC), has been worse than abysmal. Under former President Jacob Zuma, ANC functionaries pillaged numerous institutions of state. They enabled state owned institutions to be looted, mismanaged the provision of basic services and presided over an alarming downward spiral of the economy.

Evidence keeps mounting of dishonesty and profligacy. The unfolding scandal around VBS Bank has shone a spotlight on the ANC as a nest of thieves. In addition, a commission of inquiry is relentlessly exposing how Zuma’s henchmen amassed huge riches from state capture. And another inquiry into the South African Revenue Services is revealing how the state’s capacity to raise revenue from the politically powerful and influential was systematically undermined.

All in all, the ANC has completely forfeited its right to be reelected in 2019. It knows it, and is running very scared. But the odds are that it will still win, even though with its smallest majority yet.

What the party does have going for it is its president Cyril Ramaphosa. He is the ANC’s one big pull. And much to the chagrin of the Zuma faction, the party is going to have to build its election campaign around him – precisely because he is far more popular than the party. Indeed, South Africa can expect the 2019 election to bring the most presidential-style campaign yet.

The irony is that Ramaphosa will privately welcome a smaller rather than a larger ANC majority. A thumping reduction in the ANC’s vote will serve as a popular rebuff of the Zuma faction, and erode its base in the party. An ANC which knows that it may have lost its majority had it not been for Ramaphosa’s personal popularity will be an ANC in which he will at last be able to assert his authority.

A troubled party

Ramaphosa sits atop a party which has long been in a state of internal factional turmoil. He defeated his rival for the presidency, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, at the ANC’s five yearly congress with an excruciatingly narrow vote. He lacks control over the party’s national executive (its highest decision-making body between conferences) where Zuma’s supporters remain strong. And, he is facing a robust fight-back campaign by Zuma’s acolytes in provinces around the country.

Zuma himself, like Banquo’s ghost, remains an ambiguous and dangerous presence. He professes innocence of all crimes as well as continuing loyalty to the party. But, behind the scenes he’s seemingly still pulling the strings of his puppets.

With the party in a state of continuing internal war, the scramble for positions on both its national and provincial electoral lists will be overt, in some places violent, and overall, very probably, embarrassing.

Nonetheless, come the election campaign, it is more than a little likely that its competing factions will forge something of a truce, and preach a new-found unity. The ANC may be divided over policies, positions and spoils, but one thing it is united about is the necessity of retaining power. It will prove ruthless in doing so. One of the few things it knows how to do well is to run an election campaign, and how to induce or scare its popular constituency into voting for it.

Even so, it is uncomfortably aware that its base is eroding. The loyalty of its traditional supporters is declining; it is failing to attract support among “born-frees” (those born after Mandela’s release in 1990); its narrative of having liberated the country from apartheid is wearing tired and thin; and the different commissions of inquiry are going to uncover more and more dirt as the campaign goes on.

So, what is the party going to be doing to win back the vote of the disillusioned?

The campaign

ANC elections head Fikile Mbalula recently acknowledged that the party has allowed itself to become mired in “the sins of incumbency”, to have become distanced from its base, arrogant and unaccountable. Under Ramaphosa, therefore, it will be making fulsome promises of renewal. The ANC will claim that the establishment of the various commissions of inquiry signal a determined assault on corruption, and indicate that the party’s bad apples will be thrown out.

Meanwhile, in all humility, the ANC is promising to renew its bonds with the people. This will involve a country wide process of consultation with what Mbalula has referred to as “strategic sectors of society” in a bid to “broaden and deepen participation” the drawing up of a “People’s Manifesto”.

Amid all this, the party will be promising to build on Ramaphosa’s various reform initiatives to return the economy to growth.

The ANC’s major problem is that none of this is going to be particularly convincing. The gospel of the party’s commitment to virtue and renewal is going to be a hard sell to a corruption-weary electorate.

Its base divided and increasingly cynical, the ANC knows that it is going to have to look for support beyond its normal boundaries. It knows all too well that it is likely to lose important ground to the radical Economic Freedom Fighters. It knows that it may have a hard time in getting the voters out in KwaZulu-Natal, where support for Zuma remains strong. It knows that many of its traditional supporters may be tempted to record their disgust with the party by staying at home.

Given all this, the ANC knows that it will have to play to Ramaphosa as its one major asset. A Ramaphosa-centred strategy is likely to work because there is no credible alternative as a party of government to the ANC.

The main opposition Democratic Alliance will again go unchallenged in the Western Cape, and may do surprisingly well in provincial elections in provinces such as Gauteng and Eastern Cape, based upon its “better-than-the-ANC” record in local government. But at the same time it may well suffer at national level because its conservative constituency fear the prospect of the ANC losing its majority and being forced into a coalition with Julius Malema and the EFF. In short, some will hold their noses, and vote for Ramaphosa and the ANC.The Conversation

Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

 

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